TY - GEN
T1 - Game-Specific and Player-Specific Knowledge Combine to Drive Transfer of Learning Between Games of Strategic Interaction
AU - Collins, Michael G.
AU - Juvina, Ion
AU - Gluck, Kevin A.
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016.
PY - 2016
Y1 - 2016
N2 - Trust in others transfers between games of strategic interaction (e.g., iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma– PD and Chicken Game – CG). This transfer of trust represents knowledge acquired about the other player (player-specific knowledge), carrying over from one situation to another, which is separate from what was learned about the previous game (game-specific knowledge). We examine how the transfer of both player-specific and game-specific knowledge informs one’s decisions when interacting with a new player. In this paper, we present the experimental design of an upcoming study, where participants will sequentially play two games of strategic interaction (PD & CG) with the same or a different computerized confederate agent. In addition to the experimental design, we present model predictions, using a previously published computational cognitive model of trust dynamics. The model predicts transfer of learning effects in both conditions and larger effects when interacting with the same agent.
AB - Trust in others transfers between games of strategic interaction (e.g., iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma– PD and Chicken Game – CG). This transfer of trust represents knowledge acquired about the other player (player-specific knowledge), carrying over from one situation to another, which is separate from what was learned about the previous game (game-specific knowledge). We examine how the transfer of both player-specific and game-specific knowledge informs one’s decisions when interacting with a new player. In this paper, we present the experimental design of an upcoming study, where participants will sequentially play two games of strategic interaction (PD & CG) with the same or a different computerized confederate agent. In addition to the experimental design, we present model predictions, using a previously published computational cognitive model of trust dynamics. The model predicts transfer of learning effects in both conditions and larger effects when interacting with the same agent.
KW - Behavioral game theory
KW - Model predictions
KW - Multiple agent interaction
KW - Strategic interaction
KW - Trust dynamics
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84991011128&partnerID=8YFLogxK
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UR - https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/psychology/519
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-319-39931-7_18
DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-39931-7_18
M3 - Conference contribution
SN - 9783319399300
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 186
EP - 195
BT - Social, Cultural, and Behavioral Modeling
A2 - Osgood, Nathaniel
A2 - Xu, Kevin S.
A2 - Reitter, David
A2 - Lee, Dongwon
PB - Springer Verlag
T2 - 9th International Conference on Social Computing, Behavioral-Cultural Modeling, and Prediction and Behavior Representation in Modeling and Simulation, SBP-BRiMS 2016
Y2 - 28 June 2016 through 1 July 2016
ER -